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THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS AS RESTRAINTS ON THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT
IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS-INGRAHAM V. WRIGHT
Public schools that choose to enforce student discipline by the use of
corporal punishment often must contend with suits brought by students
and their parents. Frequently, these suits are in the form of civil rights
actions alleging that the discipline violated the student's Eighth
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. In addition,
the plaintiffs may charge that the practice of corporal punishment, as
authorized by state statute, violates the student's right to procedural
and substantive due process of law.'
In Ingraham v. Wright, 2 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals faced these
issues in an action brought by the parents of James Ingraham and
Roosevelt Andrews, two public junior high school students in Dade
County, Florida. The pupils were corporally punished by school officials
for various acts of misconduct. Ingraham alleged that the punishment
resulted in painful injuries, causing his absence from school.' Andrews
claimed that he was beaten twice, requiring medical treatment to relieve
his resulting discomfort.' Plaintiffs brought individual claims against
the principal and assistant principal for compensatory and punitive
damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983.1 In addition, a class action was
brought, seeking injunctive relief against the use of corporal punishment
in the school system. Plaintiffs asserted that such punishment, on its
1. Teachers who inflict corporal punishment, of course, are subject to state tort law.
Generally, the teacher is said to be in loco parentis (in the place of the parent) and thus
privileged to discipline a student to the same extent as the parents. However, if the
corporal punishment is inflicted wantonly, with malice, or with unreasonable force, then
the privilege has been exceeded, and the teacher is subject to both civil and criminal
battery charges. See, e.g., City of Macomb v. Gould, 104 Ill.App.2d 361, 244 N.E.2d 634
(3d Dist. 1969). The plaintiffs in Ingraham did not raise a tort claim. For that reason, such
actions will not be discussed in this Note.
2. 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S.Ct. 2200 (1976).
3. The opinion indicates that Ingraham was disciplined for creating a class disruption.
The punishment inflicted upon him caused painful bruises that necessitated the use of
cold compresses, pain-killing pills, and ten days rest at home. 525 F.2d at 911.
4. Andrews was punished for tardiness and for breaking glass in sheet metal class. Id.
5. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
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face and as applied, violated the Eighth Amendment' right against cruel
and unusual punishment. They also claimed that the practice of corpo-
ral punishment, authorized by Florida statute,7 deprived them of liberty
without procedural and substantive due process of law.
The district court dismissed the suit, deciding that the plaintiffs'
constitutional rights had not been violated.' In its final review, the court
of appeals, en banc, rendered an opinion containing two particularly
significant conclusions. First, the court held that the Eighth Amend-
ment guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment is inapplicable
to the administration of corporal punishment in public schools.' Second,
the court decided that the statute which authorized the use of corporal
punishment did not violate substantive or procedural due process.",
The question of the applicability of the Eighth Amendment to such
situations is unsettled.i Consequently, the Ingraham decision is signifi-
cant because the court firmly holds that the Eighth Amendment does
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
7. FLA. STAT. ANN. §232.27 (1961) provides:
Each teacher or other member of the staff of any school shall assume such
authority for the control of pupils as may be assigned to him by the principal
and shall keep good order in the classroom and in other places in which he is
assigned to be in charge of pupils, but he shall not inflict corporal punishment
before consulting the principal or teacher in charge of the school, and in no case
shall such punishment be degrading or unduly severe in its nature. Under no
circumstances may a teacher (except of a one-teacher school) suspend a pupil
from school or class.
8. After presentation of the plaintiffs' case, the court granted the defendants' motion
for a directed verdict on the ground that no jury lawfully could find an infringement of
constitutional rights. 525 F.2d at 912. The plaintiffs appealed this dismissal, and the court
of appeals remanded the case for a determination of whether the plaintiffs' Eighth Amend-
ment and due process rights had been violated. Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248 (5th
Cir. 1974). On remand, the district court again dismissed the suit after the presentation
of the plaintiffs' case. Plaintiffs appealed, and the court of appeals then decided that no
deprivation of constitutional rights had occurred. Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909 (5th
Cir. 1976).
9. This decision represented a change in position on the part of the court of appeals.
Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1974), the initial appellate review, clearly was
viewed as holding that the Eighth Amendment guarantee against cruel and unusual
punishment does apply to the administration of corporal punishment in public schools.
See, e.g., Note, Neither Corporal Punishment Per Se Nor School Board Policies that
Authorize Reasonable Corporal Punishment Violate the Eighth Amendment's Prohibition
Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, but the Unreasonable Infliction of Such Punish-
ment by Officials at One School Does Contravene the Eighth Amendment, 43 GEo. WASH.
L. R9:v. 1435 (1975); 12 HOUSTON L. REV. 500 (1975).
10. 525 F.2d 909, 915, 917 (5th Cir. 1976).
11. See notes 15 & 23 infra.
1976] INGRAHAM v. WRIGHT
not apply, and it supports its reasoning with a substantial review of the
Eighth Amendment. The holding is also important because it was made
in the face of one recent decision" which held that certain procedural
safeguards, such as notice and an informal hearing, are required prior
to the administration of corporal punishment. The question of the
Eighth Amendment's applicability to public schools and the procedural
due process requirements of corporal punishment will be considered by
the United States Supreme Court on review.'3
It is probable that the Supreme Court will affirm the Ingraham
Eighth Amendment decision and reverse the court's holding on proce-
dural due process. The purpose of this Note is to explain why the
Ingraham court's Eighth Amendment holding was sound. In addition,
it will demonstrate why the Supreme Court may modify the holding that
no procedural safeguards are required in the administration of corporal
punishment.'4
THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT TO THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
The Ingraham court held that the Eighth Amendment protection
against cruel and unusual punishment does not apply to the administra-
tion of corporal punishment in public schools.'" The court explained
12. Baker v, Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975), aff'd on other grounds, 423 U.S.
907 (1975). See notes 54-59 and accompanying text infra.
13. 96 S.Ct. 2200 (1976).
14. The substantive due process issue will not be considered in this Note for two rea-
sons. First, the issue will not be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Second, the Ingraham
court's holding on this matter was not unusual. All courts that have faced the question of
whether the practice of reasonable corporal punishment violates substantive due process
have held that such punishment is a reasonable means of achieving the legitimate state
goal of maintaining order and discipline in public schools. See, e.g., Sims v. Wain, 388 F.
Supp. 543 (S.D.Ohio 1974); Gonyaw v. Gray, 361 F. Supp. 366 (D.Vt. 1973); Sims v. Board
of Educ., 329 F. Supp. 678 (D.N.M. 1971). Thus, statutes which authorize the use of
corporal punishment consistently have been held to comply with the requirements of
substantive due process. Id.
15. Two previous cases, Sims v. Waln, 388 F. Supp. 543 (S.D.Ohio 1974) and Gonyaw
v. Gray, 361 F. Supp. 366 (D.Vt. 1973) also held that the Eighth Amendment was inappli-
cable to public schools. However, neither of those courts provided much supportive rea-
soning to substantiate its holding. In Gonyaw, the court offered a mere one-sentence
statement to the effect that the Eighth Amendment cannot be used to challenge non-
criminal punishments. 361 F. Supp. at 368. In Sims, the court made a similar statement
and attempted to justify it by citing Negrich v. Hohn, 246 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Pa. 1965),
in which the court held that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit severe corporal
punishment in prisons. 388 F. Supp. at 549-50. However, the Negrich holding is clearly
erroneous, as the Eighth Amendment is well recognized as a guard on prison conditions.
See, e.g., notes 25 & 26 infra and Comment, Prisoner's Constitutional Rights: Segregated
Confinement as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 347. The error of the
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that, historically, the Eighth Amendment had served exclusively as a
limitation on punishments imposed for criminal conduct. Therefore, the
court reasoned, the amendment cannot be used as a restraint upon
inflictions of corporal punishment in public schools. The court's ap-
proach consisted of a survey of the origins of the Eighth Amendment and
the manner in which courts have allowed it to be applied.
It easily can be established that the Eighth Amendment historically
has come to bear primarily on criminal matters. As the Ingraham court
indicated, speeches given by various statesmen at the time the amend-
ment was being considered indicate that the framers were concerned
solely with criminal punishments. 7 The court noted also that Supreme
Court decisions involving the Eighth Amendment have focused on pen-
alties invoked for criminal conduct. Particular attention was given to
dicta in Powell v. Texas," which said:
Negrich holding, upon which Sims heavily relied, renders the Sims holding equally
without precedential value. As a result, courts have ignored the Gonyaw and Sims hold-
ings and have continued to allow Eighth Amendment challenges to corporal punishment
in public schools, thus perpetuating the confusion in this area. See, e.g., Roberts v. Way,
398 F. Supp. 856 (D.Vt. 1975), a case decided in the same district as Gonyaw.
16. Other courts, however, have allowed Eighth Amendment challenges to corporal
punishment in public schools. See notes 23-27 and accompanying text infra.
17. 525 F.2d at 913 n.1. For example, at the constitutional convention held in Boston,
one representative protested that Congress had the unlimited power to "determine what
kind of punishments shall be inflicted on persons convicted of crimes. " 2 J. ELLIOT'S
DEBATES 111 (Reprint of 2d ed. 1937) (emphasis added). At the Virginia convention,
Patrick Henry expressed a similar concern, noting that Congress had the power to "define
crimes and prescribe punishments," but "when we come to punishments, no latitude
ought to be left, nor dependence put on the virtue of representatives." 3 id. 447 (emphasis
added). Later, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment was written into the
proposed constitutional amendments. One Congressman protested this provision, how-
ever, claiming that "villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut
off." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 244 (1972), quoting 1 Annals of Cong. 754 (1789).
See generally Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original
Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969); Note, Cruel and Unusual Punishment Provision of
Eighth Amendment as Restriction Upon State Action Through the Due Process Clause,
34 MINN. L. REv. 134 (1950); Note, The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment: An
Appraisal of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 846 (1961).
18. 525 F.2d at 913. Three of the cases to which the court referred were Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); and Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). In Furman, the Court held that the death penalty,
when carried out in a discriminatory and arbitrary manner, violated the Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishment Clause. In Robinson, the Court invalidated a statute which criminalized
the status of being a narcotics addict on the theory that any punishment imposed upon a
person due to his illness (addiction) was cruel and unusual. In Weems, the Court held that
a penalty of twelve to twenty years at hard and painful labor for the crime of falsifying a
public document was so disproportionate to the offense as to be cruel and unusual.
19. 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (upholding Texas statute which criminalized act of being intoxi-
cated in public place).
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[Tlhe primary purpose of [the cruel and unusual punishment clausel
has always been considered. . . to be directed at the method or kind
of punishment imposed for the violation of criminal statutes .... "
Thus, by reviewing the ratification and case history of the Eighth
Amendment, the Ingraham court reasoned that the amendment is a
limitation which applies exclusively to criminal punishments. Conse-
quently, it cannot be used to attack instances of non-criminal corporal
punishment in schools.
The Ingraham holding is supported additionally by the fact that most
courts, when faced with Eighth Amendment challenges in noncriminal
situations, have held the amendment inapplicable. For example, aliens
who have been ordered deported often have challenged these orders on
the theory that deportation would constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment under the particular circumstances involved. Since deportation is
not a criminal proceeding, courts frequently have rejected these claims
on the ground that the Eighth Amendment is inapplicable.2 Indeed,
courts have denied Eighth Amendment claims in many non-criminal
situations." It follows that, since corporal punishment in public schools
is not a criminal punishment, the Eighth Amendment is inapplicable.
It should be noted, however, that the general treatment afforded the
Eighth Amendment in non-criminal matters has not prevented some
courts from sustaining Eighth Amendment challenges to corporal pun-
ishment in public schools.23 In its review of Ingraham, the Supreme
20. 392 U.S. at 531-32.
21. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Brea-Garcia v. Immigra-
tion & Naturalization Serv., 531 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1976); Cortez v. Immigration & Natural-
ization Serv., 395 F.2d 965 (5th Cir. 1968); Chabolla-Delgado v. Immigration & Naturali-
zation Serv., 384 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1967); Soewapadji v. Wixon, 157 F.2d 289 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 792 (1946), reh. denied, 329 U.S. 833 (1947); Costanzo v. Tillinghast,
56 F.2d 566 (1st Cir.), aff'd, 287 U.S. 341 (1932); Stokes v. United States, 393 F. Supp. 24
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Buckley v. Gibney, 332 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 449 F.2d
1305 (2d Cir. 1971).
22. See Zwick v. Freeman, 373 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding Department of Agricul-
ture order effectively limiting petitioner's future employment opportunities not subject to
an Eighth Amendment challenge); United States v. Stangland, 242 F.2d 843 (7th Cir.
1957) (holding Eight Amendment inapplicable in a civil suit brought to recover penalties
due for growing wheat in excess of quota); In re Walsh, 64 Misc.2d 293, 315 N.Y.S.2d 59
(Family Ct. Westchester Cty. 1970) (holding proceeding to remove abused child from
home not subject to parents' claim that removal was cruel and unusual).
23. Indeed, a majority of those few courts dealing with the issue have held the amend-
ment to be applicable to corporal punishment. Prior to Ingraham, the Eighth Amendment
argument was rejected in only two reported cases. See note 15 supra. Courts in at least
five other cases did not object to the application of the amendment. In three of those five
cases, the court ultimately ruled that the punishment in question was not severe enough
to be considered "cruel and unusual." Consequently, these courts did not find it necessary
19761
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:121
Court will consider the justification offered by these courts. Bramlet v.
Wilson" was one such case in which the court felt justified in allowing
an Eighth Amendment claim. There, the plaintiffs brought a civil rights
action against a public school superintendent, alleging that they were
corporally punished with excessive force and that their Eighth Amend-
ment rights were violated. After the district court dismissed the suit, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded on the
ground that an excessive degree of corporal punishment could consti-
tute a violation of the Eighth Amendment. In support, the Bramlet
court cited several cases in which the infliction of severe corporal pun-
ishment in prisons was held to violate the Eighth Amendment."5 Such
reasoning, however, is not sound because the court was attempting to
justify an application of the Eighth Amendment to non-criminal behav-
ior in public schools by citing cases involving punishments for criminal
conduct. It is doubtful that such questionable reasoning will persuade
the Supreme Court to reverse the Ingraham decision. "
In Roberts v. Way,27 the District Court of Vermont allowed an Eighth
Amendment challenge to corporal punishment, basing its holding
largely on Trop v. Dulles."5 In Trop, the United States Supreme Court
to offer reasoning in support of the Eighth Amendment's applicability. See Glaser v.
Marietta, 351 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Sims v. Board of Education, 329 F. Supp.
678 (D.N.M. 1971); Ware v. Estes, 328 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd mem., 458
F.2d 1360 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972).
24. 495 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1974).
25. Id. at 717. The cases cited were Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968);
Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972), aff'd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); and Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972).
26. One of the cases that both the dissent in Ingraham and the Bram let court cited was
Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972). That case involved the use of severe
corporal punishment at the Indiana Boys School, which was technically not a prison but
rather a medium security correctional institution. About one-third of the boys were "non-
criminal" offenders. It can be argued persuasively that this was nevertheless a case of
"criminal" punishment within the context of the Eighth Amendment for two reasons.
First, a two-thirds majority of the boys in the institution technically were criminal offend-
ers. Second, the remainder of the boys were there because of previous actions inflicted
against society. According to state law, such conduct may not be categorized as "criminal"
because of the age of the offender. Nevertheless, such offensive conduct is in essence
criminal, and thus within the scope of the Eighth Amendment. Ingraham v. Wright, 525
F.2d 909, 923 (5th Cir. 1976) (Rives, J., dissenting); Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 717
(8th Cir. 1974).
27. 398 F. Supp. 856 (D. Vt. 1975). In Roberts, a sixth grade pupil was corporally
punished, and a civil rights action subsequently was brought against several school offi-
cials for damages and an injunction. In response to the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the
court held that certain instances of corporal punishment could be restricted by the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause.
28. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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said that the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."29
The Roberts court determined that this flexibility in interpretation jus-
tified a decision that the amendment could be violated by certain in-
stances of corporal punishment in public schools.
The Supreme Court, in its review of Ingraham, undoubtedly will con-
sider whether the Trop Court intended such an interpretation. An exam-
ination of the facts in Trop reveals that the Roberts court may have
erred in basing its decision on that statement. In Trop, the Court held
unconstitutional the section of the Nationality Act of 194010 which pro-
vided that persons who are convicted of wartime desertion and dishonor-
ably discharged will lose their citizenship. Chief Justice Warren's opin-
ion, with which three Justices concurred," first questioned whether the
statute involved was "penal" in nature and thus subject to the con-
straints of the Eighth Amendment. He reasoned that the statute could
serve no legitimate purpose other than punishment.32 Consequently, the
statute was considered to be essentially "penal" and therefore subject
to the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. In considering whether
loss of citizenship was a cruel and unusual punishment, the Court re-
marked that the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."3 Thus, it appears that the Trop Court's statement regarding
the Eighth Amendment's flexibility was intended to convey the idea
that the words "cruel and unusual" should be interpreted flexibly
within a criminal or penal context. The Court did not mean to imply
that the Eighth Amendment should be applied to any situation, regard-
less of whether a criminal punishment is involved.
It can be argued that the situation in Trop was non-criminal and,
therefore, the Court was allowing a non-criminal application of the
amendment. If true, then Trop would lend strong support to the position
that the amendment is applicable to public schools. However, that posi-
tion appears weak. Even though the loss of citizenship involved in Trop
was not imposed by criminal authorities, the fact remains that it was
inflicted pursuant to a conviction by court-martial, a proceeding of
criminal character. In addition, the Court frequently referred to the act
29. Id. at 101.
30. 8 U.S.C. §1481(a)(8)(1970).
31. Justices Black, Douglas, and Whittaker concurred in Chief Justice Warren's opin-
ion. Justice Brennan concurred in the Court's decision but, in his own opinion, explained
that he felt that the statute was unconstitutional in that Congress did not have the power
to take away citizenship for penal reasons.
32. 356 U.S. at 97.
33. Id. at 101.
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of wartime desertion as a "crime."'" Thus, it does not appear that the
Court viewed its holding as allowing a non-criminal application of the
Eighth Amendment.
It also can be argued that the infliction of corporal punishment in
public schools is essentially "penal" and that therefore the Eighth
Amendment should apply.3'- However, that argument assumes a very
broad interpretation of the word "penal." It is doubtful that the Trop
Court intended that the concept of "penal" practices should be ex-
tended to include corporal punishment in public schools. In Trop, the
punishment was imposed after conviction in a formal court-martial pro-
ceeding. However, in the administration of corporal punishment, there
is no proceeding of an essentially criminal nature. Therefore, the classi-
fication of corporal punishment as "penal" within the context of the
Trop opinion is questionable.
Hence, it is clear that the ratification and application of the Eighth
Amendment demonstrate that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause generally has served as a limitation only upon criminal punish-
ments. In addition, the reasoning offered by the courts which have ex-
tended the amendment to noncriminal situations is not sound. The
Bramlet court mistakenly justified the extension by citing criminal
cases. The Roberts court's reliance on Trop also was misplaced because
Trop was an essentially criminal case. It does not support a non-
criminal application of the Eighth Amendment. Furthermore, corporal
punishment cannot be classified as "penal" in the sense of the Trop
opinion and, therefore, is not subject to the constraints of the Eighth
Amendment. Thus, the Supreme Court can be expected to affirm the
Ingraham Eighth Amendment decision, holding that the amendment
cannot serve as a restraint on inflictions of corporal punishment in pub-
lic schools."
34. Id. at 90, 91, 92, 93, 99, 103.
35. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
36. The Ingraham dissent felt that part of the opinion in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954), supported the idea that the Eighth Amendment should be applied to
public schools in the administration of corporal punishment. It cited a passage of Brown
in which the Supreme Court discussed its interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment:
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the
amendment was adopted . . . .We must consider public education in the light
of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the
Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools
deprives the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws . . .
525 F.2d at 923, quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. at 492-93. However, that
passage does not serve as a theoretical basis for applying the Eighth Amendment to public
schools. In Brown, the Supreme Court redefined the concept of equal protection. The
I[Vol. 26:121
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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT
The demands of procedural due process of law require that state gov-
ernmental activities that infringe upon Fourteenth Amendment con-
cepts of liberty and property must be accompanied by minimum proce-
dural safeguards." In determining whether such safeguards are required,
the court first will define the property or liberty interest in jeopardy."
Secondly, the court will determine what procedural safeguards, if any,
are necessary. Although these procedures have been defined in various
ways, the basic concept appears to be that deprivations of liberty or
property by the state must be "preceded by notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case."3
In Ingraham, the plaintiffs alleged that those procedures required by
statute regarding the administration of corporal punishment did not
satisfy the requirements of due process. In Florida, the only procedure
actually mandated was a consultation with the school principal prior to
punishment. 0 The court felt that no further safeguards were necessary.
In so holding, the court followed the reasoning employed in other public
school corporal punishment cases such as Gonyaw v. Gray,"1 Glaser v.
Court did not extend the application of the Fourteenth Amendment. In contrast, the
dissent in Ingraham was attempting to extend the protection of the Eighth Amendment
to situations in which the amendment had never applied. Brown cannot be used as author-
ity for the dissent's proposal.
37. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164 (1974).
38. The interest is not required to be secured by the Constitution. See, e.g., Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975), in which the Supreme Court held that a student's prop-
erty right to public education, though founded in state law and not the United States
Constitution, nevertheless falls under the protection of procedural due process.
39. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). The requisite
procedures also have been characterized as those dictated by "fairness and reasonableness
in light of the totality of circumstances." Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 917 (5th Cir.
1976), citing Hannah v. Larcht, 363 U.S. 420 (1960) and Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). "The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the
opportunity to be heard." Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). "Parties whose
rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that
right they must first be notified." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972), quoting
Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1854).
40. See note 7 supra. A local school board policy provided other limitations, such as
administering the punishment with "kindness." However, the facts in Ingraham showed
that this policy clearly was not followed. 525 F.2d at 916 n.6.
41. 361 F. Supp. 366 (D.Vt. 1973). In Gonyaw, the plaintiffs were 12-year old students
who had been punished with several strokes of a belt. The plaintiffs alleged that the state
statute which authorized the use of corporal punishment in schools violated procedural
due process. The statute itself included no provisions for procedural safeguards:
A teacher . . . may resort to any reasonable form of punishment, including
corporal punishment, and to any reasonable degree, for the purpose of securing
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Marietta,"2 and Sims v. Board of Education. " Those decisions indicated
that such punishment is not a sufficiently serious deprivation of rights
to warrant additional procedural safeguards.
The Ingraham holding may prove to be erroneous. A close analysis of
the Supreme Court's current standing on procedural due process, to-
gether with a consideration of the facts in Ingraham, indicates that
certain procedural safeguards may be required by the Constitution in
administering corporal punishment.
Applying a due process analysis, it first must be determined whether
the student has an interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment in
avoiding physical intrusions. The Supreme Court has indicated that the
right to liberty includes "freedom from bodily restraint."" The Court
has also noted that the concept of liberty is to be interpreted broadly.'5
Corporal punishment, like restraint, is an intrusion upon physical dig-
nity. Thus, it appears reasonable to conclude that a liberty interest in
avoiding physical intrusions such as corporal punishment does exist."
obedience . . . or for the purpose of securing or maintaining order in and control
of [a] school.
VERMONT STAT. ANN. ch. 16, §1161 (1973). The plaintiffs also alleged that the corporal
punishment was in violation of the Eighth Amendment and substantive due process. See
notes 14 & 15 and accompanying text supra.
42. 351 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Pa. 1972). In Glaser, the plaintiff was given three "medium"
paddle strokes. He unsuccessfully alleged that the school district regulation that guided
the administration of corporal punishment violated procedural due process. The regula-
tion provided that the student should be informed of the reason for punishment and that
it should be administered in the presence of another adult. 351 F. Supp. at 556.
43. 329 F. Supp. 678 (D..N.M. 1971). In this case, the plaintiff received moderate corpo-
ral punishment. A civil rights action was brought for declaratory and injunctive relief,
alleging that the punishment violated the Eighth Amendment, and also that the school
district regulation which guided the use of corporal punishment violated procedural and
substantive due process. See note 14 and accompanying text supra. The regulation pro-
vided that corporal punishment should be administered in the presence of the school
principal. 329 F. Supp. at 680.
44. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972), quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Property interests, on the other hand, are characterized as "interests
that a person has already acquired in specific benefits." Id. at 576. The right to freedom
from physical punishments thus seems categorized more appropriately as "liberty" than
"property."
45. Id. at 572.
46. The possible origins of a basic liberty interest or right to avoid physical punishment
are many. It has been suggested that this right is derived directly from the Fourth Amend-
ment. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Court said, "The overriding
function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against
unwarranted intrusions by the State." 384 U.S. at 767. See Brief for Petitioner at 52,
Ingraham v. Wright, - U.S. __. It also has been suggested, in the context of sub-
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One question remaining is whether any procedures are required by the
Due Process Clause to protect that liberty interest. In so determining,
the severity of the deprivation is not conclusive. 7 Rather, the nature of
the interest governs." Thus, if the right or interest of which the individ-
ual is being deprived is one protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,
then the individual has a basic right to procedural protection." The only
existing qualification is that the liberty or property deprivation must be
greater than de minimis. 5" Applying that concept to Ingraham, it is
arguable that corporal punishment is by its nature a deprivation of
liberty that is greater than de minimis."1 The Supreme Court always has
viewed physical intrusions with suspicion and has noted that "[elven
a limited search of the outer clothing" is a "severe . . . intrusion upon
cherished personal security." 2 Certainly, then, physical contact to the
student's body, which often is painful and capable of causing injury,
is a deprivation of liberty that is not so insubstantial as to be termed
de minimis. It follows that the student does have a basic right to pro-
cedural protection in corporal punishment.
stantive due process, that such a right is inherent in the penumbral right to privacy
pronounced in the abortion decision of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Note,
Corporal Punishment-Schools and School Districts-Constitutional Law, 12 DuQ. L.
REV. 645 (1974). This same theory could be applied to procedural due process.
47. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975), quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86
(1972).
48. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575-76 (1975), quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
49. Id.
50. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975). Here, the Court held that a student is
entitled to certain procedural safeguards before being suspended from a public high
school. The Court viewed suspension as a deprivation of the student's property interest
in education as well as his or her liberty interest in maintaining a good reputation. Id. at
576. The Court ultimately held that procedural safeguards were required before suspen-
sion because "suspension from school is not de minimis." Id. at 576. Thus, the Court
apparently applied the de minimis test to both property and liberty, although the Court
had earlier mentioned the de minimis test in terms of a property deprivation without
mentioning liberty. Id. at 576. At any rate, the Court has not indicated that property and
liberty interests are to be treated differently. They frequently are discussed together, and
apparently are viewed only as terms that help to define the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972).
51. For this analysis, corporal punishment is defined as the purposeful striking of a
pupil for purposes of chastisement. In its less severe forms, this type of punishment is
often referred to as a "paddling," and is inflicted with the intention of producing mild
pain. Thus, instances in which a teacher may grasp a student's arm while reprimanding
him would not qualify as corporal punishment.
52. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Once the basic right to protective procedures has been established, it
must be decided specifically what procedures are required. It is in this
analysis that the severity of the liberty deprivation may be considered,
together with the state's interest and purpose in infringing upon that
liberty.-, The Supreme Court, in its review of Ingraham, will consider
the potential severity of the deprivation of liberty which occurs in the
infliction of corporal punishment, along with the state's interest in
maintaining order and discipline in the public schools. Then some rea-
sonable due process requirements will be formulated for the imposition
of such punishment.
Such a procedure was outlined by a three-judge district court in Baker
v. Owen," the only reported case requiring that corporal punishment be
administered within the constraints of certain procedures. In Baker, a
civil rights action based on 42 U.S.C. §198311 was brought on behalf of
a sixth grade pupil who had been paddled moderately. The plaintiffs
asserted that the statute which authorized the use of corporal punish-
ment" was in violation of the Due Process Clause.57 Upholding the
statute on its face, the court prescribed a supplemental three-part
procedure.-, Basically, this procedure required that the student must be
informed which behavior may invoke corporal punishment, that the
punishment must be carried out in the presence of another school offi-
cial who is informed of the reason for punishment, and that the parents
be provided a written explanation of the reason for punishment on re-
quest."
53. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
54. 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975), aff'd on other grounds, 423 U.S. 907 (1975).
55. See note 5 supra.
56. NORTH CAROLINA GEN. STAT. §115-146 (1975), which provides, in relevant part:
Principals [and] teachers . . . in the public schools of this State may use
reasonable force in the exercise of lawful authority to restrain or correct pupils
and maintain order.
57. The court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the infliction of reasonable corporal
punishment upon a child without his or her parents' consent was in violation of a parental
right to govern the upbringing of the child. The court noted that such a parental right is
not "fundamental." Therefore, it is not necessary that the state show a "compelling
interest" in corporal punishment. Rather, it was sufficient that the practice of reasonable
corporal punishment bore a reasonable relationship to the legitimate state objective of
maintaining order in the schools. 395 F. Supp. at 300.
58. The court held that corporal punishment is a deprivation of liberty which is greater
than de minimis. 395 F. Supp. at 301.
59. The protective effect of this procedure lies in the fact that the student has an
opportunity to protest his innocence to a responsive school official. Also, the officials are
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In applying the current concepts of procedural due process to the
question of corporal punishment, it appears that the Ingraham court
erred in refusing to require procedural protection. The Supreme Court
should be expected to reverse this holding and mandate some minimal
procedural standards for the administration of corporal punishment.
These procedures need not be elaborate or formal. The reasonable steps
set forth in Baker would be satisfactory and fair to both the student and
the state.
CONCLUSION
The Ingraham court's holding that the Eighth Amendment is inap-
plicable to public schools in the administration of corporal punishment
is well supported by the ratification and case history of the amendment.
Those courts that have held to the contrary have relied upon questiona-
ble reasoning that should not persuade the Supreme Court to reverse the
Ingraham holding. The Ingraham court's refusal to mandate procedural
protection in the imposition of corporal punishment may not be as
soundly based. In view of the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements
on procedural due process, it would be consistent for the Court to require
some minimal procedures to accompany this mode of student discipline.
David J. Novotny
held accountable to the student's parents. This decreases the possibility that students will
be punished arbitrarily or without sufficient reason. For a commentary on the Baker
decision and a discussion of the practical implications of the court's holding, see Note,
Procedural Due Process in the Administration of Corporal Punishment, 11 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 703 (1975).
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